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Introduction
According to the traditional distinction between domestic and inter-
national politics, governing within the state was conceived as a hierarchical
‘command and control’process. Only governments were authorized to take
collectively binding decisions. In contrast, the political space beyond the
state lacked the central political authority of a world government and was
consequently described either as an anarchical system (Waltz 1977) gov-
erned by self-help and power politics, or as a society of states (Bull 1977)
governed by horizontal arrangements, such as treaty-based relationships
which regulated the peaceful coexistence between nation-states. In both
spheres, the national and the international, governing functions were
reserved to public actors, that is to national governments or the intergov-
ernmental institutions created by them. The main diﬀerence existed in the
prevalence of a one-way or an interactive model of governing.
This traditional domestic–international distinction has been completely
overthrown by the growing governance demands. In the interdependent
world of today, collective action problems cover an ever-increasing
number of issue areas other than national security, such as environmental
matters, social and economic human rights. These problems straddle the
existing territorial boundaries of political units and call for the extension
of public policy beyond the state. Economic globalization creates chal-
lenges for political steering which exceed the capabilities of any single
state. It has produced a growing need (and claim) to make use of the
problem-solving potential of non-state actors in order to master these
challenges more eﬀectively. As a consequence, these new demands have
also blurred the dividing lines between the national and the international
sphere, and, increasingly so, those between the public and the private
sectors. They call for ‘social–political governance’in the sense of ‘arrange-
ments in which public as well as private actors aim at solving societal prob-
lems or create opportunities, and aim at the care for the societal
institutions within which these governing activities take place’ (Kooiman
2000, p. 139).
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brought together public and private ‘governors’in multistakeholder, mul-
tilevel and multimode sectoral governing arrangements which add up to
the complex interaction patterns of ‘global governance’. This new polit-
ical agenda also made it obsolete to keep the analytical tool-kits of the
diﬀerent subdisciplines of political science separate from each other any
longer: on the one hand, public policy research and normative political
theory were both unfamiliar with the context beyond the state to which
their core research issues, such as eﬀective problem solving or democratic
legitimacy, respectively, were emigrating; on the other hand, the study of
international relations was likewise unprepared to deal with these
new questions.1 Today, the need to integrate the diﬀerent analytical per-
spectives is no longer seriously questioned because of the obvious drain
of economic, social and political processes into the sphere beyond the
state.
In the next section I shall deal with the emergence of the new
social–political forms of public–private governance patterns beyond the
state. In many ways the new interplay between the state, business and civil
society in global governance resembles the process of political modern-
ization changes which could be observed in the domestic sphere and is
associated with terms such as ‘de-hierarchization’ (Scharpf 1991) or ‘de-
governmentalization’ (Zürn 1998; Wolf 1999).2 The following section
analyses the implications of the new modes of governance on the actors
involved. With their involvement in new governance arrangements, the
roles of governments, international organizations, civil society and the
private sector are shifting. All of these actors are still in the process of
redeﬁning their traditional roles,identities and functions in the light of the
regulatory demands to which they are exposed. The subsequent section
deals with the new interplay between the state, business and civil society.
Compared to its predecessor, that is treaty-based intergovernmentalism,
global governance is a patchwork of diﬀerent modes of governance, con-
sisting of actors from diﬀerent environments who are equipped with very
diﬀerent resources, and who are used to quite diﬀerent compliance mech-
anisms.Some of these mechanisms presume that actors follow the interest-
based logic of consequences, whereas others are based on the assumption
that political actors follow the logic of appropriateness.3 To  achieve a
better understanding of these new modes of governance I shall suggest
some categories for the way they correspond with certain actors’ constel-
lations and the way they function. The ﬁnal section takes up normative
considerations about the desirability of a the privatization of world poli-
tics and evaluate the regulatory potential as well as limits of the new gov-
erning relations.
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context and beyond the state
The emergence of new governing relations in the sphere beyond the state is
best conceived of as the international follow-up of the domestic political
modernization process which took place within most of the OECD coun-
tries before. Domestically and at the international level, it resulted from
market failure and the failure of the traditional media of political steering
– that is, regulative law and ﬁnancial incentives – to correct them. The
‘limitations of traditional public command-and-control as a governing
mechanism’ (Kooiman 2000, p. 139) became obvious with the regulatory
overstretch of the modern welfare state. When the promises of national
governments to provide public goods or to prevent public bads in such
ﬁelds as macroeconomic planning or social safety entered the turbulent
waters of globalization, they were confronted with a new collective action
problem: they met challenges the causes of which – and the resources
needed to meet them – were beyond the command of any single govern-
ment, or even beyond the world of states as a whole.
Among the numerous strategies employed by national governments to
increase their problem-solving capability, the more direct involvement of
the former societal addressees of public regulation into the governance
process was one. This step towards societal participation was not primarily
motivated by democratic concerns, but rather followed the rationale to
increase problem-solving eﬀectiveness by utilizing the knowledge and other
resources that only private actors could provide,and to increase the support
and acceptance of political decisions by co-opting the former addressees as
partners in decision making.
In the traditional pluralist model of domestic policy making and interest
intermediation, societal lobbying groups were competing for access to and
inﬂuence on public policy decisions. At the domestic level, this model was
ﬁrst challenged when big corporate actors were integrated and allowed to
participate in consensual corporatist policy formulation and implement-
ation. In their new roles, however, they were still dependent on the recogni-
tion of the state (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). But the next step of
political modernization even left these corporatist patterns of interest inter-
mediation behind and promoted a further de-hierarchization of the relations
between public and private actors. Increasingly bypassing the traditional
political institutions, horizontal decision-making structures emerged which
operated according to the modes of bargaining and arguing. On the one
hand, the state had to respond to ‘societal actors claiming participation in
the political process, while, on the other hand, cooperation with these actors
oﬀers the state the opportunity to obtain informational resources and can
improve the acceptance of certain political decisions’ (Mayntz 1993, p. 41,
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chical state–society relations gave way to the idea of the negotiating,enabling
or cooperative state.Even this stage of political modernization in the domes-
tic context still counts – and depends – on the state, but it does so in terms
of a new functional division of labour and authority between public and
non-state actors from which additional problem-solving resources are
expected (Ronit and Schneider 2000). Table 11.1 summarizes the emergence
of the new governing relations within the state.
The limitations of hierarchical governing mechanisms become particu-
larly obvious when we employ Jan Kooiman’s (2000, pp. 154–61) distinc-
tion between ﬁrst-, second- and third-order or ‘meta’ governing.4 The
demand for such a new division of labour is strongest at the levels of meta
and ﬁrst-order governing. With regard to the creation of normative stand-
ards (meta governing), the command-and-control approach is unlikely to
meet the high demand of normative consensus which can only be achieved
in the public exchange of good reasons; with regard to ﬁnding solutions for
concrete day-to-day problems (ﬁrst-order governing), it cannot provide
resources, such as factual knowledge, which depend on the involvement of
professional expertise.
International governance
In the political space beyond the state, horizontal governance – however as
a purely intergovernmental enterprise – had always been the rule because
of the lack of the central authority of a world state. The world of states
took its ﬁrst step out of its original stage of anarchy when national gov-
ernments entered into voluntary self-commitments as sovereign subjects of
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Table 11.1 Changing forms of political regulation within the state: from
government to governance
Organizational form Pluralist Corporatist Partnership
Relationship of the  Diﬀerent societal Institutionalized Various forms of
state with business lobbies compete (‘incorporated’) horizontal
and civil society to inﬂuence participation by deliberative
public policy major associations cooperation in
decisions taken in consensual governance




Source: Bressel and Wolf (2005, p. 188).
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ation of international organizations and regimes, they transferred sectoral
governance functions from the domestic to the intergovernmental public
sphere. In terms of political modernization, the treaty-based institutional-
ization of the society of states is a remarkable achievement because it estab-
lished the rule of law against the original right of self-help, which included
the arbitrary use of violence. While this process of legalization was more
or less eﬀective in civilizing the interaction among states, its problem-
solving capacity came under severe criticism in the face of challenges that
did not originate from the world of states. On the one hand, the legitimacy
of internationalizing political decision-making processes was questioned
because it strengthened the role of the national executives vis-à-vis parlia-
mentary control (Wolf 1999); on the other hand, the economic, social and
environmental challenges of globalization resulted in regulatory and imple-
mentation gaps which individual governments, as well as the intergovern-
mental institutions created by them, were unwilling or unable to close
eﬀectively. In the face of growing world market competition, for example,
neither the International Labour Organization nor the World Trade
Organization had succeeded in generating, proliferating and enforcing
minimum legal standards eﬀectively with regard to business activities
involving abuses of human rights, compulsory labour or child labour. In a
similar fashion, the change of the global climate raised the challenge of re-
programming economic systems in accordance with excessive demands of
sustainable economic development which the heads of the leading indus-
trial nations who coordinate their policies in the G-8 are reluctant or unable
to meet. As a consequence, ‘private actors increasingly engaged in author-
itative decision-making that was previously the prerogative of sovereign
states’ (Cutler et al. 1999b, p. 16), thus reﬂecting the transition of the
society of states into a ‘world society’.
Beyond international governance
Domestic de-regulation and the delegation of authority to non-state actors
is ‘increasingly . . . creeping into the international sphere’ (ibid., p. 15).
Today there seems to be a general belief that – very similar to what had pre-
viously been experienced in the national realm – intergovernmental regimes
and organizations are inadequate political instruments for solving the col-
lective action problems emanating from ‘de-nationalized’ economic, social
and environmental processes.To regard ‘states as the sole providers of public
goods has become an increasingly inappropriate over-simpliﬁcation’because
technological and commercial forces, notably the market-driven diﬀusion of
information technology, ‘alter the relative capabilities of diﬀerent types of
actors to solve . . . collective action problems, in particular increasing the
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former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Koﬁ Annan, accurately
described the need to overcome the limits of international governance in
order to cope with the fundamental problems in world society when he stated
that ‘peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involv-
ing Governments, international organisations, the business community and
civil society. In today’s world, we depend on each other’ (Annan 1998).
Following this course, the political modernization of international gover-
nance has given rise to various new kinds of transnational governance
arrangements in which public and private actors pool resources, share
responsibilities – and re-deﬁne themselves.
Shifting roles: new identities of states, business and civil society as political
agents
Statehood in transition
The traditional role of the state is most severely aﬀected by its interplay with
private actors in governing processes. However, ‘it is generally more appro-
priate to speak of shifting roles of government rather than of shrinking roles
of government as part of such changing relationships’ (Kooiman 2000,
p. 139, original emphasis). Governmental retreat from the classical
command-and-control governing mechanism in the course of the de-hierar-
chization of state–society relations may of course not only be described as
‘political modernization’, as I did in the previous section. This description
follows what may be called a ‘policy-for-problem-solving’paradigm of polit-
ical steering and governance. From the perspective of political realism, for
instance, the role shift of governments would rather be conceptualized as a
‘power shift’, as a ‘relative decline of states and the rise of nonstate actors’
(Mathews 1997, p. 51; see also Strange 1996; Reinalda and Verbeek 2001).
However, ‘sharing powers’ does not necessarily make the state ‘weaker’ as a
provider of public goods than its interventionist elder brother. The shadow
of hierarchy is still present; the whip is still in the window. But the negotiat-
ing, enabling or cooperative state is less keen on running things ‘from above’
than on regulating and monitoring self-regulation. The new regulatory state
is interested in reducing its governance contributions to functions which can
exclusively, or most eﬀectively, be provided by the public sector: establishing
operational meta rules, setting the legal framework for private governance
contributions and regulating externalities. Political modernization thus still
counts – and depends – on the state, but it does so in terms of a new func-
tional division of labour and authority between public and non-state actors.
With regard to domestic governance, Christoph Knill and Dirk
Lehmkuhl (2002) have distinguished certain circumstances under which
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According to them, the assumed distribution of problem-solving resources
among the public and private sectors determines which role the state will
take up vis-à-vis private actors. If public problem-solving capabilities are
high and private capabilities are low, we are likely to observe the traditional
‘hierarchical’state; high capabilities on both sides favour the role model of
the ‘cooperative’ state; the ‘complementary’ state will be the result of low
public and high private capabilities; if the capabilities of public and private
actors are low, the state is likely to act as an ‘intervening’ state.
Although these role models have been developed for describing the
changing role of the state in the course of domestic political moderniza-
tion, these categories may also be helpful to describe public–private inter-
action patterns in governance beyond the state. However, one crucial
diﬀerence has to be taken into account: national governments lose their
unique qualities as holders of public authority as soon as they want to exer-
cise power over actors not belonging to the domestic realm. At the global
level, national governments are no longer automatically ‘in authority’ due
to their quality as public actors (Wolf 2006, p. 212). Rather, they have to
arrange themselves with private actors making equally legitimate claims to
‘market’ or ‘moral’ authority based on ‘normative, uncoerced consent or
recognition’ (Hall and Biersteker 2002, p. 5).
The new roles of civil society
Paul Wapner’s deﬁnition of civil society as a ‘domain of associational life
situated above the individual and below the state’ (Wapner 1997, p. 65) is
still valid. In domestic societies, as well as in world society, this domain is
populated by civic groups who are private in form, because – unlike gov-
ernments – they are not and do not want to become part of the state appa-
ratus, but public in purpose, because – unlike companies – they understand
their activities not as commercial but as value oriented and as direct con-
tributions to the provision of public goods (Reinalda 2001). This has con-
tributed to shaping their image as ‘the better half of world society’ (Take
2000). The broad range of increasingly important roles (Mathews 1997)
which actors from civil society have played is reﬂected in a number of labels
(see among others Princen and Finger 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998;
Scholte 2000): ‘activists’, ‘transnational social movement organizations’,
‘grassroots organizations’or ‘advocacy groups,coalitions or networks’.Jan
Aart Scholte (2000, p. 177) summed up these diﬀerent appearances as
follows: ‘In sum, civil society exists whenever people mobilize through vol-
untary associations in initiatives to shape social order’.
The general importance of civil society participation in global gover-
nance has been under dispute time and again in the academic debate.5
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restricted information and thereby contribute to the equal regard of out-
siders’interests otherwise not represented; or they can provide a channel of
accountability (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 436). Furthermore, they
can ‘help states and multilateral institutions to formulate, implement,
monitor and enforce policies’ (Scholte 2000, p. 174).
As agenda setters, civic groups originally acted as external agents, most
memorably in the streets of Seattle in 1999. Many of them still prefer con-
frontational tactics in order to mobilize public support for policy alterna-
tives, keen on not losing their independence by being co-opted or by
cooperating too closely with public authorities or market actors. Others try
to aﬀect decision-making processes by making their way into the institu-
tions which have so far been dominated by governments: as lobbyists, as
consultants to national delegations, or as observers to international organ-
izations and conferences.
With regard to implementation, actors from civil society can either play
a more cooperative role, for example when they fulﬁl operative functions
(such as carrying out projects or being instrumental as monitoring agen-
cies) delegated to them by public actors, or act as independent watchdogs
by criticizing public or business actors who do not implement or comply
with certain legal or voluntary commitments. In this watchdog function,
civil society actors may enter into unoﬃcial coalitions with like-minded
national governments or international agencies against norm-violating
states, as is typically the case in the ﬁeld of human rights, and thereby con-
tribute signiﬁcantly to strengthening the status of international norms.
Civil society actors possess political inﬂuence to the extent that they can
muster widespread support and consent to their authority, which stems
from their role as credible providers of expert advice or from the moral
authority accorded to them.They act as epistemic actors whose basic polit-
ical resource is information. Civil society actors can initiate deliberative
processes in order to promote certain standards of appropriateness, to
reframe certain issues and/or to change the preferences of other actors.
They may also use normative reasoning strategically in order to impose
social costs on other actors by shaming them in the eyes of the general
public. They may even switch between deliberative and strategic modes of
interaction according to the institutional environment.6
With their interaction with intergovernmental institutions increasing,
actors from civil society have also changed their roles,behaviour and some-
times identities.One may dispute whether this identity shift has been caused
primarily by external or internal dynamics (Martens 2005); however, there
is little doubt that external pressures and expectations are increasingly
raised vis-à-vis civil society actors, for example by invitations to collaborate
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look both at the diﬀerent functions in which diﬀerent non-governmental
organizations perceive themselves, and at the mode of interaction which
prevails in the global governance institutions to which they relate, it would
be inaccurate to generalize their role shift in terms of ‘from outside specta-
tors to oﬃcial participants’. In fact, civic groups have shown very diﬀerent
responses to such invitations, often as part of a strategic division of labour
among them.
The most signiﬁcant role change occurred with regard to the more direct
involvement of transnational civic actors in the core of regulatory func-
tions: originally their role had focused either on the input phases of the
political process, that is agenda setting, norm generation, programme
development or, further down the output side of the political process, on
norm implementation or the evaluation of policies. Now their involvement
is shifting from these peripheries to the actual centre of decision making
within public–private or multi-stakeholder self-regulation.
The new role of business: once problem causers, now problem solvers?
Since the 1990s the scholarly debate on the role of transnational actors in
world politics7 seems to have primarily dealt with transnational civil
society.However,transnational corporations have a much longer history of
academic interest, and had appeared in the role of political actors in world
politics already as early as in the mid-16th century, particularly in colonial
areas to which today’s governance would refer as ‘areas with limited state-
hood’ (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). Historians rightly point to the import-
ant role that chartered private merchandising companies played right until
the end of the 19th century when they ran commercial and trading empires
which covered vast territories (Griﬃths 1974; Keay 1993). The Hudson’s
Bay Company, for example, originally operated on the basis of a Royal
Charter by King Charles II in 1670, which granted the company ‘absolute
power to establish and enforce laws . . . as well as have its own soldiers,
maintain a navy and make peace – or war’ (Andra-Warner 2003, p. 37).
In the meantime, business went through a number of stages as a highly
disputed object of political and scholarly debates. In most cases, trans-
national corporations were subject to scrutiny as originators of regulatory
problems rather than as problem solvers,as addressees of public legal regu-
lation rather than as private regulators or partners in public–private gover-
nance arrangements (see, among others, Baade 1980; Fikentscher 1980).
The major innovation of the present political and academic debate about
the role of corporations in world politics lies in their rediscovery as polit-
ical actors through the lens of global governance. Instead of continuing to
look at them solely as economic actors in globalizing markets who have
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tory potential and the limits to it are investigated once again (Cutler et al.
1999a; Graz and Nölke 2007). Corporate responsibility, corporate social
responsibility, or corporate citizenship (see, among others, Ruggie 2002;
Matten and Crane 2005; Scherer and Palazzo 2007) are used as concepts to
re-deﬁne the role of business vis-à-visthe state and civil society and to read-
just the distribution of rights and obligations among the three sectors in the
face of state failure as well as market failure. Notions associated with these
concepts may vary widely, but they all go beyond the traditional under-
standing of corporations as actors who are private in form and private, that
is commercial, in purpose. Understandings are quite diﬀerent, however,
with regard to the voluntary nature of corporate contributions to the pro-
vision of public goods.The philantropic ‘charity’view of ‘doing good’after
work diﬀers substantially from the self-commitments expected by the UN
Global Compact from ‘corporate citizens’ (Global Compact Oﬃce 2004)
as part of their core business activities. Even more far-reaching is the
understanding of corporate responsibility as norm entrepreneurship in the
sense of commitments not only to support and enact certain core values
when doing their business, which would ‘only’ blur the traditional bound-
aries between business and civil society, but also to actively engage in self-
regulatory activities of norm generation and implementation, which of
course also blurs the boundaries between the private sector and the state.
All of these notions seem to contradict conventional wisdom, which
starts out from the actor-centred assumption that the prime motivation for
business actors is, and has to be, proﬁt maximization. Survival in the mar-
ketplace rules out norm-oriented behaviour,and whenever companies enter
into individual or collective self-commitments, no such codes of conduct
would ultimately be capable of setting constraining limits to this logic of
action. However, this assumption and the consequences derived from it are
an inappropriate oversimpliﬁcation. They neglect the fact that the market-
place is not the only environment which makes demands on business.
Rational business actors have to take into account the challenges posed by
globalized markets, but also those emanating from the world of states and
transnational civil society. The interaction of the three worlds of market,
state and civil society makes up a normatively enriched environment, so
that ‘market rationalism’ may acquire a diﬀerent meaning under these
altering context conditions. In the face of public pressure or the threat of
state regulation, ‘doing good’ may even be the most rational strategy to
evade the risks associated with adverse campaigning or public regulation
(Conzelmann and Wolf 2007).
Such rationalist conceptualizations still rely on fear of coercion and self-
interest as the only drivers for business contributions to global governance.
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appropriateness and point to the emergence of a global epistemic commu-
nity made up of like-minded corporate leaders, scientists and public regu-
lators that have deﬁned certain standards of appropriate behaviour for
ﬁrms (Hauﬂer 1999, p. 215).
On the basis of these considerations, and in trying to deﬁne its new role
vis-à-vis the public sector and transnational civil society, business actors
have to make their choice among three ideal-type role models: they can
follow a ‘narrow’market rationalism,a ‘complex’market rationalism,or an
intrinsically norm-oriented behaviour. While ‘narrow’ market rationalism
would consider societal and political forces as inﬂuential only in so far as
they can be translated into short-term risks and opportunities in the mar-
ketplace, ‘complex’ market rationality would anticipate reputational and
political costs in the cost–beneﬁt calculations of business actors. Finally,
the existence of a normatively textured environment may also give rise to
an increased reﬂection on corporate responsibility and to the recognition
of certain values as guiding principles for business conduct. The result may
be an ‘intrinsic’ motivation of business to observe and implement ethical
principles even where there is no clear economic or political incentive to do
so. In the light of the choices described here, and without giving up the
notion that corporations still are and will remain ‘private in form and
private in purpose’, the potential of business actors to contribute to the
provision of public goods in the context of global governance should not
be underestimated.
New modes of governance between the state, business and civil society 
The underlying key question of this chapter regards the conditions under
which non-state actors can be expected to make meaningful contributions
to global governance,for example by acceding to and complying with codes
of conduct. To answer this question at the actor level, the motivations of
these non-state actors have to be discussed; on a structural level, however,
the environmental conditions under which they act have also to be taken
into account.8
The transition from international to global governance has increased the
degree of complexity of governance beyond the state substantially.
Hierarchical governing modes dominated by the public sector (or taking
place in the strong shadow of hierarchy cast by it), public–private co-
governing, private self-governing, and all kinds of hybrid mixtures of these
ideal types add up to an irritating patchwork of sectoral regulatory mech-
anisms. The multidimensionality of this complex global governance patch-
work – perfectly described as ‘komplexes Weltregieren’b y Zürn (1998) –
results from the amalgamation of the diﬀerent political resources brought
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the domestic political–institutional setting, the national governments have
the monopoly of the legal authority to set collectively binding rules and to
implement these rules with coercive power. Business corporations are
equipped with the economic and technological know-how and the ﬁnancial
resources necessary to be successful competitors on the market. Actors
from civil society,ﬁnally,often have moral authority and factual knowledge
at their disposal as politically relevant resources.
In addition, in their original environments all of these actors have been
socialized into speciﬁc modes of interaction: hierarchical legal or adminis-
trative regulation is the traditional way of governing by the state.
Horizontal bargaining and arguing characterize interactions in the market
or in public discourse, respectively. Making the interplay between them
even more complex, each of these modes of interaction relies on a speciﬁc
causal mechanism for achieving compliance. The compliance mechanism
characteristic of interactions dominated by the state is fear of sanctions.
Compliance in market relations,on the other hand,primarily rests on mate-
rial or non-material cost–beneﬁt expectations and follows the interest-
based logic of consequences. Making things even more complicated, the
compliance mechanism characteristic of the sphere of public discourse pre-
supposes actors whose behaviour is guided by a logic of appropriateness
rather than by rationalist cost–beneﬁt calculations.In this realm,actors are
expected to comply only if they are convinced of the normative appropri-
ateness of rules which they ﬁrst internalize and then obey. Table 11.2 illus-
trates the diﬀerent dimensions of context-speciﬁc traditions which have to
be reconciled when the state, business and civil society enter into in to col-
lective governing activities.
Given this variety of resources, context-speciﬁc logics and rationalities
which govern the behaviour of the diﬀerent actors in their respective spheres,
their interaction inevitably must produce hybrid forms of governance which
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Table 11.2 Contextual backgrounds of the state, business and civil society
State Business Civil society
Resources Legal authority Money Moral and
Coercive power Technical expertise factual authority
Sphere Political institutions Market Public discourse
Mode of interaction Hierarchical Bargaining Information,
arguing
Compliance Fear  of coercion Self-interest Belief in
mechanism appropriateness
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and compliance mechanisms, often combining elements which may not be
compatible or which may neutralize each other’s impact. Conditions which
facilitate governance in the mode of bargaining may be detrimental to those
under which arguing can be eﬀective. For example, the relevance of trust or
mistrust, transparency or secrecy, alters dramatically according to the
respective modes of interaction.
New actors’ constellations
At a ﬁrst and very elementary descriptive level, the new modes of gover-
nance resulting from the interplay between the state, business and civil
society can be distinguished according to diﬀerent actors’ constellations:
governance arrangements beyond the state which involve private actors
can:
1. still be initiated, sponsored, or even dominated by the public sector. In
this category the shadow of (public) hierarchy is still present, but the
darkness of the shade may vary.In this kind of publicly embedded self-
regulation the degree of de-governmentalization would still be low;
2. consist of multistakeholder initiatives, where more horizontal patterns
of interaction prevail and the state,civic groups and corporations meet
on an equal footing; and
3. be pure instances of private self-regulation with no direct public sector
involvement, neither by the state nor by intergovernmental organiza-
tions, neither in a hierarchical manner nor in any other way as ‘equals’.
Here of course the highest degree of de-governmentalization can be
observed.
In Table 11.3, some empirical examples are given of global governance
initiatives representing the three diﬀerent types of actors’ constellations.
They also show that all types can be found in the main issue areas of global
governance.
New modes of interaction
The fact that accession to and compliance with these self-regulatory initia-
tives are voluntary gives rise to the suspicion that they are only symbolic
and serve to ‘greenwash’ business and take oﬀ the pressure from govern-
ments to put in place an eﬀective and forceful regulation (Conzelmann and
Wolf 2007). This widespread criticism starts out from a certain notion of
how compliance mechanisms should operate in order to be eﬀective. At
least implicitly, it still favours public intervention by administrative law,
backed by the coercive power of the state, over soft and horizontal modes
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ernance by government, has lost part of its signiﬁcance in the course of the
domestic political modernization processes discussed above. For gover-
nance beyond the state, it was never appropriate as a model. Global gover-
nance institutions – very much like the above-mentioned intergovernmental
institutions characteristic of the period of international governance – are
typically based on compromise or consent rather than on fear of coercion,
simply because there is no Leviathan available in an international system
consisting of sovereign territorial states. Given these conditions, in the
international sphere even national governments perform their regulatory
functions best, not if they can impose norms, but because of consent, that
is, if the norms and rules they generate and try to implement are regarded
as legitimate and/or as serving the self-interest of those who are subject to
those rules (see also Buchanan and Keohane 2006, pp. 409–10). In that
sense, it becomes important to go beyond the fear of coercion as compli-
ance mechanism and to discuss alternative conduits by which non-state
actors may contribute to the provision of public goods.
Fear of public regulation
In the context of transnational private self-regulation, even the potential
threat of governments imposing binding legal regulation in the case of vol-
untary self-commitments failing to show the expected eﬀects may improve
the robustness, reliability and sustainability of self-regulation among private
actors. This expectation rests on the assumption that private self-regulation,
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Table 11.3 Public, multistakeholder and private self-regulation in diﬀerent
policy areas
Environment Security and human Corruption and
rights organized crime




Multistakeholder Forest Voluntary Business
governance Stewardship Principles on Principles for
initiatives Council Security and  Countering
Human Rights Bribery
Private  Responsible Care Antwerp Resolution Wolfsberg
self-regulation of the World Principles
Diamond Council
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generation and implementation, is driven by business’ intention to avoid
state intervention in the market. In order to achieve this goal, they are
doomed to success. But this embeddedness in pending public regulation
could have yet another impact on private eﬀorts trying to anticipate them:
even if, at a later stage, public regulation would follow, its substance would
already be pre-shaped by the norms and rules of private self-regulation.
These expectations as to the potential impact of a pending fear of coercion
on private self-regulation go along with the suspicion that in the absence of
this ‘whip in the window’ the reliability of voluntary self-commitments
would suﬀer. Private self-regulation, in order to meet certain demands on
political regulation, would therefore always depend on the capability and the
willingness of public actors to intervene.
Material market incentives
How far can private self-regulation contribute to the provision of public
goods, if market forces are the only mechanism to secure compliance? In
this case, in a narrow cost–beneﬁt calculation, ‘doing good’is only rational
if and as long as it helps companies to ‘do well’, for example, by improving
the image of a certain brand in relation to competitors. This causal mech-
anism rests on a rationalist background according to which rules are
obeyed when they are in line with the self-interest of rule followers to
maximize individual beneﬁts and to minimize individual costs. However,
as Buchanan and Keohane (2006, p. 410) rightly point out, support
fora ninstitution ‘based on reasons other than self-interest or the fear of
coercion . . . may be more stable’.
Social costs by public shaming
The threat of intervention by legally binding public regulation is not the
only environmental factor which can potentially raise the quality of the
contributions that private self-regulation can make to the provision of
public goods. Another factor originates from the embeddedness of self-
regulation in a societal environment in which civic groups are vigilant and
strong enough to raise public attention concerning the conduct of busi-
nesses. In this case, the underlying assumption is that the reputational costs
associated with public shaming will increase the likelihood that voluntary
unilateral or multilateral self-commitments of companies come into exist-
ence and that their rules are actually implemented. Even if companies pro-
claim normative self-commitments only for strategic reasons, without
actually being convinced of their appropriateness, the importance of the
societal environment lies in securing rule-consistent behaviour by helping
the logic of ‘rhetorical self-entrapment’to unfold.9This consideration leads
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ground of rationalism behind and employ basic assumptions of social
constructivism.
Legitimacy assumptions and moral obligations
Apart from fear of coercion and self-interest (in its narrow and its more
complex meaning), rule following may also be caused by the legitimacy
assumptions which the subjects of regulation attribute to global gover-
nance institutions and by the sense of appropriateness attached to their
rules. Such legitimacy assumptions can grow on the basis of moral reasons,
but also on factual knowledge about how an institution works and about
the degree to which it contributes to the provision of public goods without
committing serious injustices, such as violating human rights (Buchanan
and Keohane 2006, p. 420). As the author of this chapter has pointed out
elsewhere (Conzelmann and Wolf 2007), any public order, domestic or
beyond the state that rested exclusively on sanctions and deterrence of
potential transgressors would demand enormous resources. Therefore, the
weight on these ‘hard’compliance mechanisms is usually sought to be light-
ened by creating moral obligations to follow norms,for example,by appeal-
ing to collective identities or by highlighting the legitimacy of these norms.
As a consequence, the binding force of regulations may actually origi-
nate from several sources: the sense of obligation created by the norms and
rules on which they are based; actors’rational calculation of the gains they
can expect from rule compliance;and the subordination by the threat or use
of force. With regard to global governance arrangements which are char-
acterized by the interplay among states,business and civic groups,the polit-
ical challenge is not necessarily to increase the regulatory and sanctioning
capacity of public bodies at the international level, but rather to increase
the legitimacy of global governance institutions so that compliance with
their rules can also count as appropriate conduct.
All institutional designs and compliance mechanisms discussed in this
section have their speciﬁc strengths and weaknesses as far as their
eﬀectiveness, the likelihood of operating in the general interest and the
validity of assumptions made about the motives of actors are concerned.
As most of the governance arrangements which are already based on role
shifts of the participating actors are still new,we do not have enough empir-
ical evidence to substantiate generalizing judgements. In so far, and unlike
regulatory initiatives that rely exclusively on the logic of sanctions and
deterrence or material market incentives, they have the privilege of not yet
having had the opportunity to reveal their weaknesses. However, some
general remarks can be made that are based on the compatibility of certain
compliance mechanisms with the diﬀerent regulatory challenges that have
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likely that shared legitimacy assumption will result in a stronger commit-
ment to the normative standards established at the meta level of governing.
This means that the shadow of state hierarchy is a negligible factor in this
context and that ‘voice’is more important than ‘vote’here. The availability
of the unique coercive instruments of the state may, however, become of
crucial importance for issues of second-order governing,in particular when
it comes to safeguarding by legally binding rules the institutional condi-
tions under which ﬁrst-order problem solving can take place with full and
equal stakeholder participation. At the level of ﬁrst-order governing,
ﬁnally, the availability of a broad range of problem-solving resources and
a public which can set into motion shaming mechanisms speaks in favour
of multistakeholder arrangements and compliance mechanisms which rely
on factual expertise on the input side of the political process, on trans-
parency on the throughput phase, and on public monitoring of implemen-
tation measures.
Institutional demands for the legitimacy of transnational global governance
In this chapter we ﬁrst described the emergence of new modes of gover-
nance beyond the state; then dealt with the role shifts of actors that went
along with this process; subsequently, taking into account diﬀerent
assumptions about actors’ motivations, I analysed the conditions under
which private actors might be expected to provide meaningful contribu-
tions to global governance in the interplay among the state, business and
civil society.The following ﬁnal section takes up again the issue of strengths
and weaknesses, but places it in the broader context of the general desir-
ability and limitations of the privatization of governance beyond the state.
This normative discussion will result in some considerations about institu-
tional demands for the legitimacy of transnational global governance.
Theoretical perspectives on the legitimacy of global governance institu-
tions may be distinguished according to their state-centredness and the
degree to which they adhere to, or transcend, the normative demands
derived from the ideal type of the parliamentary democracy of the territo-
rially based nation-state. A very basic ﬁrst distinction stems from diﬀerent
constitutional assumptions about the international system:is it desirable to
establish democratic statehood at the supranational level, as envisaged by
cosmopolitan approaches (Held 2005), or do we conceive of the political
space beyond the state as a non-state polity characterized by functional
self-regulation, that is by horizontal modes and sectoral scopes of policy
making? Leaving state-centrism behind, a second cluster of distinctions
refers to the way in which certain governance functions should be assigned
to certain levels within a multilevel governance setting in order to achieve
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ist world society,Habermas,for example,allocates juridical functions to the
supranational level and political functions to the level of horizontal self-
coordination (Habermas 2005). Lastly, the public–private axis of distinc-
tion picks out as a central theme of the implications of the new interplay
among the state, international institutions and private actors for the legit-
imacy of governance. Obviously these are of particular interest here. In
what follows I shall therefore concentrate on the public–private dimension
of the legitimacy issue by linking it with Kooiman’s (2000) functional dis-
tinction between ﬁrst-order, second-order and meta governing which has
already been introduced.
Despite the general lack of a commonly agreed-upon set of positive nor-
mative criteria for the legitimacy of global governance institutions, there is
at least some agreement on ‘the unrealistic view that legitimacy for these
institutions requires the same democratic standards that are now applied to
states’(Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 405). Rather, institutional designs
should take the speciﬁc contexts of governance beyond the state more seri-
ously and venture into ‘context-adequate’ standards of legitimacy (Wolf
2002, 2006). With regard to the inclusion of private actors, in particular,
there seems to be no fundamental contradiction between the privatization
of governance beyond the state and the provision of public goods, because
none of the three types of actors dealt with above pursues a genuine public
interest in this sphere. In fact, the boundaries between what is public and
what is private, and hence which actors act in the public interest, are much
less clear in the political space beyond the state. In this context even
(national) governments follow ‘private’, that is particularistic, purposes of
their own (namely, their ‘national interest’). Public and private actors turn
out to be much more similar units in the international sphere than this
general distinction would suggest. In fact, some (private) actors from civil
society may be the most likely candidates as protagonists of what is gener-
ally perceived to be the common good.
How far does the new interplay between the state, business and civil
society aﬀect legitimacy, and what kind of legitimacy standards should be
applied to transnational global governance? A ﬁrst answer to these ques-
tions could be the objection against applying any legitimacy standards to
this sphere which go beyond certain demands of output eﬀectiveness with
regard to the provision of public goods in the general interest. This argu-
ment could be based on the voluntary nature of self-regulation which does
not produce any necessity for maintaining self-determination, nor for
checks and balances to control power and maintain the rule of law. Where
no one exerts power, there is no need to control it. Following Max Weber’s
(1921 [1976]) concept of legitimacy as the legitimate authority to use power
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where we have no collective subordination by coercion, there is no need for
legitimacy either;where no one rules,there is no need to legitimize anyone’s
right to rule.
The functional bias of the more output-oriented governance debate
tends to support this view (Mayntz 2006,p. 12).Under the governance par-
adigm,the notion of the nature of politics has shifted from ‘exerting power’
to ‘solving collective problems’. Rather than treating these two notions as
separate, the following considerations are based on the assumption of a
functional linkage between eﬀectiveness and legitimacy,according to which
an institution’s right to rule is accepted and its rules are obeyed as being
binding because they are regarded as legitimate. This view provides us
with a better understanding of the reﬂexivity and interconnectedness of
eﬀectiveness demands and the normative demands of legitimacy derived
from democratic theory. From both perspectives, participation plays a
crucial role.
However, criteria for inclusion diﬀer: eﬀectiveness (or output legitimacy)
demands procedural mechanisms which respond to factual knowledge
problems and guarantee a meaningful participation by those aﬀected by
rules. At the level of ﬁrst-order governing, these demands of output legit-
imacy can be met, for example, by the inclusion of experts or specialists
because they can contribute knowledge-based problem-solving resources,
the lack of which would otherwise hinder eﬀectiveness. Those aﬀected by
rules also have to be included because their cooptation is likely to facilitate
the success of rule implementation. In both cases, inclusion means ‘voice’
rather than ‘vote’ because matters of neither self-determination nor power
control are primarily at stake here. Thus, the day-to-day routines of formu-
lating and implementing concrete sectoral problem-solving policies leave
abundant space for private involvement, with the eﬀect of mobilizing add-
itional sources of output legitimacy, as long as practical solutions are in
accordance with the standards of appropriateness established at the level of
meta governing. At that level, similar legitimacy gains can be achieved by
including private actors in the discourse about the normative standards by
which the appropriateness of certain approaches to problem solving is to be
judged, as long as these actors ﬁnd recognition as being ‘“an authority” in
the sense of holding the expertise of a scholar or an expert or specialist’
(Cutler et al. 1999c, p. 367) and accept the rule of impartial reasoning. In
sum, the inclusion of the argumentative and knowledge-based authority of
private actors from business and civil society can improve the output legit-
imacy of governance processes at both levels by their substantial contribu-
tions, based on factual expertise (at the level of ﬁrst-order governing) or on
moral credibility (at the level of meta governing). However, the recognition
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private actors’claims to inclusion in policy processes of voluntary and hor-
izontal self-regulation, but not in the context of coercive subordination and
command models of political obligation which still depend on legal (public)
authority.10
In contrast,democratic (input and throughput) legitimacy demands pro-
cedural mechanisms for participation which are not directly geared at
increasing the concrete problem-solving capability of global governance
institutions or the quality of the exchange of moral reasons, but which pri-
marily aim at controlling the use of power.In order to achieve this goal,the
institutional architecture of transnational governance arrangements must
guarantee a certain transparency of the political process; furthermore, it
needs participation mechanisms that are ‘vote’ rather than ‘voice’ oriented
and guarantee formal equality. It is only under these conditions that the
subjects of regulation and those aﬀected by it can be provided with the nec-
essary information and leverage to hold institutional agents accountable
and to attach costs if they fail to provide certain public goods; in other
words, and reiterating the interconnectedness of input and output con-
cerns: those aﬀected by regulation must have the means to evaluate the per-
formance of a global governance institution and, if necessary, to initiate
institutional reforms.
If and by how far such means are at hand, depends on decisions at the
level of second-order governing, which deals exactly with the shaping of
institutional settings within which governing at the two other levels can
take place. There is still little evidence as to what extent and at what costs
private actors can be expected to provide, maintain and protect the consti-
tutional framework within which they operate, whether they are capable of
allocating institutional capabilities eﬀectively, securing formal equality
and protecting the weak against the power of the strong. All these second-
order governing functions may require enforcement and subordination.
Although some of the private and multistakeholder governance initiatives
listed in Table 11.3 operate as most interesting ‘governance laboratories’in
that respect as well,notably the Forest Stewardship Council (Pattberg 2005,
2006), non-state standard setting and implementation still seems to depend
on its complementary relationship with state or interstate public regulation.
Even the most prominent functional equivalents to the checks and balances
institutionalized within the political systems of democratic states, such as
functioning market mechanisms and eﬀective access to open public dis-
courses as prerequisites for securing the accountability of privately domi-
nated global governance networks, cannot be provided by private actors
alone.Therefore,the overall legitimacy of global governance arrangements
has to rely on some kind of public sector participation – at least on its
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binding regulation at the national or intergovernmental level in case vol-
untary private self-regulation fails to operate and provide public goods in
accordance with the meta rules established at the level of meta governing.
Notes
1. The research on international regimes is a good example to illustrate this: originally,
private regimes (Hauﬂer 1993) or regime consequences (Breitmeier and Wolf 1993) were
still only an appendix to the mainstream of regime analysis (see Rittberger and Mayer
1993). The North American mandarins only recently took up the normative turn seri-
ously by seeking support in political theory (see Buchanan and Keohane 2006).
2. Governance beyond the state does of course still take place with the participation of gov-
ernments, but it is de-governmentalized in more than one sense now: it inherited the pre-
dominantly horizontal modes of interaction from the former intergovernmentalism
which also lacked the shadow of hierarchy that the existence of a (world) state could
provide; but furthermore, it is also de-nationalized in that political processes have dis-
persed over several levels of policy-making, of which the national level is only one, and
the national governments share responsibilities with international organizations and
private actors from business and civil society (see also Reinicke 1998).
3. According to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (see March and Olsen 1984, 1989) the nor-
mative environment may lead to processes of reorientation and learning, and is poten-
tially able to change identities and interests of business actors.
4. According to Kooiman’s (2000, p. 154) typology, ‘[f]irst-order governing aims to solve
problems directly ....Second-order governing attempts to inﬂuence the conditions
under which ﬁrst-order problem-solving or opportunity creation takes place’. Third-
order, or meta governing, deals with the creation of the normative standards by which
the appropriateness and legitimacy of concrete policy programmes and the demands on
an enabling institutional setting can be evaluated.
5. Virginia Hauﬂer does not even regard civil society actors as strong enough to have a
serious impact as independent agents: ‘Either they will be used as instruments of state
policy, or they will “use”states to implement their own goals’ (Hauﬂer 1993, p. 106).
6. The establishment of the International Criminal Court shows how civil society can even
combine both strategies by acting as norm-entrepreneurs who strategically prepare the
conditions under which new norms can be generated in deliberative processes (see
Deitelhoﬀ 2006).
7. For an excellent and well-balanced overview, see Risse (2002).
8. With the exception of some alterations, this passage follows Conzelmann and Wolf
(2007).
9. For the role of shaming, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) or Keck and Sikkink (1998);
Risse et. al (1999). For rhetorical self-entrapment, see Schimmelfennig (2001). The basic
argument claims a causal mechanism by which – under the conditions of a functioning
public sphere and an already existing reputation sensitivity – initial opportunistic and
strategically motivated commitments to certain norms oﬀer a starting-point for shaming,
and in the long run can change actors’ behaviour and even become internalized.
10. This conceptualization of the legitimacy of private authority in contrast to the legal
authority carried by the state is reminiscent of Weber’s distinction between the legiti-
macy sources of legal and charismatic authority (Weber 1921 [1976], pp. 124–30,
140–44).
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